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CONTRACTS OF AGENCY WITHOUT STIPULATIONS
AS TO DURATION*
THOMAS PORTmE HARDMAN**
The Restatement of Agency by the American Law Insti-
tute provides that "A contract of agency, or a contract of
service, is the contract, when one exists, which determines
the existence, duration, terms or conditions of the [agency]
relation."' But what is the duration of the relation when
this so-called "contract of agency" contains no stipulation
as to how long the employment is to continue? And how
does the so-called contract of agency determine the duration
in such cases? It is the purpose of this comment to discuss
the West Virginia cases on this point.
Since agency is a consensual,2 not a contractual,8 relation,
and therefore since a contract of agency is not essential to
the relation,4 the general validity and effect of the contract
of agency constitute more properly a part of the law of con-
tract than a part -of the law of agency.' But there is one
very common and important type of agreements of agency,
namely, agreements without stipulations as to duration,
which several courts, including the West Virginia court,
sometimes treat in such a stereotyped manner as to justify
*This comment is a part of a study of the West Virginia law as affected
by the RESTATMENT OF AGENCY by the American Law Institute and is
largely an elaboration of an annotation of §7 of the AGENCY RESTATEMENT.
**Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
- THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, AGENCY, RESTATEMENT No. 1, §7 (1925).
Italics ours.
2 That agency is a consensual rather than a contractual relation is shown
(sufficiently for present purposes) by the fact that one can be an agent
though he has no capacity to contract (i. e., where there can be no con-
tract), provided that the requisite consent exists; Fenner v. Lewis, 10
Johns. (N. Y.) 38 (1813), 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §274 (1920); and by
the fact that one may be an agent though he is acting gratuitously and not
under a sealed authority (i. e., where there is no contract), provided that
there is the requisite consent. Bank of White Sulphur Springs v. Lynch, 93
W. Va. 382, 386, 116 S. E. 685 (1923). See the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
AGENCY, RESTATEMENT No. 1, §2 (1925).
3 See n. 2, supra. But see 1 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed. §42 (1914), and
contrast Uniontown Grocery Co. v. Dawson, 68 W. Va. 332, 69 S. E. 845
(1910).
4 This is sufficiently shown by the fact that one who has no capacity to
contract can nevertheless be an agent. See n. 2, supra.
S Cf. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §39 (1920). See also The AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §32, particularly
Illustrations, 1 and 2 (1928).
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special consideration. Accordingly, it is herein proposed to
compare the important West Virginia cases on this point,
particularly since the two principal cases,' both recent, are
(apparently without the court's realizing it) clearly contra
to each other, at least in their reasoning, and since these
two contrary West Virginia cases are highly representative
of the almost chaotic conflict of extra-state authority.
In the first West Virginia case, Resener v. Watts, etc.,
Company,' decided in 1913, the agreement of agency was "an
agreement for a monthly salary and expenses, and the fur-
ther compensation of five per cent commissions, in excess of
salary and expenses, on goods sold by ** * [the agent], the
excess to be ascertained and paid on settlements made at
the end of each year."'  The agent acted "until May", when
he quit and sued for his commission on goods sold before he
quit. The defense was that the hiring was for a year. The
court held that he could recover for the reason that an
agreement to act at so much per month is terminable (or
"presumed" to be terminable) at any time by either party,
the court quoting with approval a statement from Wood on
Master and Servant9 that "a hiring at so much a day, week,
month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hir-
ing, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even,
but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may
serve; * * * and in such cases, the contract may be put an
end to by either party at any time, unless the time is fixed".
In the second case, Alkire v. The Orchard Company,"°
decided in 1917, the contract of agency simply provided for
"a salary of $100 per month". The agent acted "until De-
cember" when he was dismissed. He then sued for salary
for the following January, claiming that the contract was
for a year. The court refused recovery on the ground that
a contract at a monthly salary which does not specify any
duration is "simply a monthly employment" and "may be
s Resener v. Watts, etc., Co., 73 W. Va. 342, 80 S. E. 839 (1913); Alkire
v. Orchard Co., 79 W. Va. 526, 91 S. E. 384 (1917).
7 73 W. Va. 342, 80 S. E. 839 (1913).
5 This is the court's statement of the terms of the agreement. Italics
ours.
9 §136.
'a 79 W. Va. 526, 91 S. E. 384 (1917).
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terminated at the end of any month by either of 'the parties
thereto."
Which case, then, represents the better view? The first,
that such an agreement is terminable (or "presumed" to be
terminable) at will by either party, or the second, that such
a contract is terminable only at the end of the specified
period for which the salary or wages are stipulated? Or
is there a preferable third view? A peculiar thing about
the two West Virginia decisions is that in each case the
court should have reached the same conclusion which it
actually reached even if the court had followed the contrary
doctrine which it purported to lay down in the other case.
Moreover, the second West Virginia case does not even cite
the first, although less than four years had elapsed between
the two decisions. Nor does either counsel cite the first
case in his brief in the second case. Furthermore, in a re-
cent West Virginia case materially in point, Stewart v.
Blackwood, etc., Corporation,1 the court, in awarding a new
trial, completely avoids the question and does not cite either
of these two cases. Let us, therefore, compare and consider
the two decisions. In the first case, the Resener Case, the
court relies largely on Wood on Master and Servant, where-
as the cases cited by Wood do not fully support him.12
Moreover, the court cites no West Virginia decisions and
admits that there is a conflict of extra-state authority.13
And, as already indicated, if the court in the Resener Case
had adopted the contrary doctrine followed in the Alkire
Case, that an employment at so much per month or other
fixed period, is terminable at the end of the month or such
other period, the result in the Resener Case would (so far
as this point is concerned) have been precisely the same, for
the employ6 had acted "until May", that is to say, to the
end of a month, and, therefore, had terminated his monthly
employment (if it was a monthly employment) at the end
of the month.
Furthermore, in the Resener Case, it was contended that
the employer understood that the employment at a monthly
11 100 W. Va. 331, 130 S. E. 447 (1925).
12 See a discussion of the cases cited by Wood in Annotation, 11 A. L. R.
469, 475-477 (1921).
13 See Resener v. Watts, etc., Co., supra, n. 6, at p. 344.
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salary was an employment for a year at so much per month;
and on this point the court holds that unless the under-
standing of the employer and employ6 "was mutual that the
service was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period,
it is an indefinite hiring, and is terminable at the will of
either party * * *. Here there is no such proof. To con-
stitute an agreement, the minds of the parties must concur,
or meet upon its terms; otherwise, there is no agreement... 4
On this latter point, it would seem that the doctrine of
the court is unsound, for the court employs the subjective
theory of contract, that to create a contract there must ac-
tually be a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.
This theory of contract is a concept of the civil law, and,
though sponsored in the nineteenth century by Anson"0 and
others, is today generally considered untenable and is sup-
planted by the objective theory that there is a contract if
the words or acts of the parties, judged objectively, consti-
tute an agreement. 7 Therefore, in the Resener Case, if the
reasonable impression of the parties was that the employ-
ment was to be for at least a year, there is a contract of
agency whose duration is at least a year, though there may
have been no actual inward meeting of the minds on this
point. As Mr. Justice Holmes has said (in effect), to lead
a person reasonably to suppose that you assent to an ar-
rangement (e. g., an agreement for a yearly employment) is,
in the sense of the law, to assent to the arrangement. 8
Therefore, the Resener Case is wrong in this respect at least.
The agreement of employment stipulated that in addition
to a monthly salary, the emlIloye was to receive a connis-
sion on goods sold and the commission was "to be ascer-
ta-lied and paid o settlements made at the end of each
year." It is submitted that the question whether such an
agreement is terminable at will, or only at the end of each
month, or only at the end of each year, is simply a question
of the interpretation of the agreement of the parties. But
ii Id. at p. 346.
15 See the able criticism of the subjective theory of contract in 1 WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS, §§20-22, 94 (1920).
v3 ANSON, LAW OF CONTRACT (Huffcut, Second American Ed.) p. 2 (1906).
I7 Plate v. Durst, 42 W. Va. 63, 24 S. E. 580 (1896). See 1 WILLISTON,
op. cit., supra, n. 15, §§20-22, 94; WIGIOMRE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed. §2413 (1923).
14 In O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 463, 14 N. E. 747 (1887).
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this interpretation is to be determined objectively. As Wig-
more on Evidence puts it: "The person using words is to
be treated from the point of view of the reasonable man, not
only in determining the actual tenor of his act, but also in
interpreting it."" On the question of construction, as the
United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Holmes, has
recently said, "Words are flexible."'  In the Resener Case,
the words used are reasonably susceptible of meaning em-
ployment for at least a year. Therefore, if, judged objec-
tively, the understunding of the parties was that the em-
ployment was to be at a monthly salary for at least a year
(as the commission was "to be ascertained and paid on
settlements made at the end of each year") it is a contract
of agency terminable at the end of the year, rather than a
mere agency at will. In accord with this view a recent New
Jersey decision held that a similar agreement constituted
a yearly employment, whose duration is at least a year.2 1
Where an agreement of employment contains no stipula-
tion at all as to duration, not even a provision that the em-
ploy6 shall receive a fixed sum for each day, week, month,
year, or other definite period, the American authorities gen-
erally treat the relation as an agency at will,2" sometimes as
if such an agreement necessarily creates an agency at will.2
The better view, however, is believed to be that whether
such an agreement constitutes an agency at will, or a
contract for a definite period, is a question of fact de-
pending upon -the objectively judged understanding of the
parties.2 But where there is no trustworthy evidence of
19 WIGMfoRE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., §2466 (1923).
20 In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 5Z (1920).
21 Lyons v. Pease Piano Co., 92 N. J. L. 592, 107 Atl. 66 (1919).
22 Moore v. Security, etc., Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496 (1909); Christensen v.
Pacific Coast, etc., Co., 26 Ore, 302, 38 Pac. 127 (1894); Coffin v. Landis,
46 Pa. 426 (1864). No effort has been made to collect all authorities touch-
ing on this point or on this general problem as they are too numerous to
justify citation. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §39 (1920), citing authori-
ties. See also a collection of cases in Annotation, 11 A. L. R. 409 (1921).
The West Virginia case of Resener v. Watts, etc., Co., supra, n. 6, also sup-
ports this view, though in the Resener Case the agreement of agency con-
tained a stipulation (among others) "for a monthly salary". The court,
however, put the agreement in the same category as agreements without
any stipulations as to duration.
23 See, e. g., Fulkerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 Ark. 144, 161 S. W.
168 (1913).
24 See 1 WILLISTON, op. cit., supra, n. 15, §39.
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such understanding, how is the question to be decided? In
England it is generally held that such an agreement creates
an employment for a year.2 But in the United States the
authorities generally say that such an indefinite hiring is
terminable at any time by either party, 2.1 some authorities,
though expressing it inaccurately, laying down what is be-
lieved to be the correct doctrine, namely, that there is a
"presumption", or, to express it more accurately, that there
is an inference of fact," that such an agreement constitutes
an agency at will.2 8  It is believed that this inference of
fact is based on the common experience (in the United
States at least) that, where reasonable persons enter into
an agreement of employment and do not stipulate as to
duration, they do not normally understand that there is any
definite duration. Hence, in such cases, it is only fair to
start with a rebuttable inference of fact that the duration
was understood to be indefinite and terminable at any time
by either party. Therefore, in the absence of evidence out-
weighing this inference, the cases in the United States gen-
erally hold, in effect, that such an indefinite agreement cre-
ates no executory obligations. 9
But the Resener Case erroneously applies this sound doc-
25 See 1 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT, 2d ed., §156 (1913), collecting
cases. See also 1 WILLISTON, op. cit., supra, n. 15, §39.
2" See n. 22, supra.
27 As to the distinction between a true "presumption", and the so-called
"presumption of fact", a mere inference of fact, see WGMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d
ed., §§2487, 2491 (1923).
23 Moore v. Security, etc., Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496 (1909). See also, 1
MECHE.m, AGENCY, 2d ed. §592; and 1 LABATT, op. cit., §§159, 160. Many
cases laying down this doctrine are cases of employment at so much per
fixed period which in this respect the courts treat as employments in-
definite as to duration. See, e. g., Resener v. Watts, etc., Co., 73 W. Va.
342, 80 S. E. 839 (1913); Associated Newspapers v. Phillips, 294 Fed. 845
(1923), (opinion by Judge Henry Wade Rogers); and Miller v. Rodd, 285
Pa. 16, 131 Atl. 482 (1925).
20 Compare 1 W wsTox, op. cit., supra n. 15, §39, reaching this con-
clusion but not wholly by this reasoning. It is believed however that this
is the general effect of the decisions. See particularly Moore v. Security,
etc., Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496, 499 (1909) which MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed.,
§592 cites as his principal authority for the proposition that there is a
"presumption" that such indefinite agreement constitutes an agency at will.
The court, per Sanborn, J., actually says that there is a "strong pre-
sumption" to that effect. This language indicates a so-called "presumption
of fact" (a mere inference of fact) rather than a true presumption. As
to the distinction between the two, see WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., §§2487,
2491 (1923).
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trine to cases where there is a provision for so much per
given period of time. Of the cases supporting such an ap-
plication of the doctrine, Williston on Contracts" says that
in reaching this result courts have "failed to observe that
such a construction should, if possible, be put upon the
lanugage of palties who enter into an agreement as will
give rise to a legal obligation. It is true that a hiring at
so much a day does not specify the length of time that the
service may endure, but it may fairly be presumed that the
parties intended the employment to last for at least one day.
So if the payment is fixed by the week, month, or year. It
is, of course, possible that this mode of exlpression was mere-
ly to fix the rate of compensation, but in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it seems a fair presumption [in-
ference of fact]" tLt the parties intended the employment
to last at least for one such period. The fact that they re-
garded it as possible that the employment should continue
beyond one period would not prevent a definite contract be-
ing formed for the first period; and should the parties con-
tinue their relation after the expiration of the first period,
another contract by implication of fact would arise for an-
other similar period. This view is adopted by many courts
of high standing.2  It is believed these decisions are
sound."
3" §39.
'1 See n. 27, supra.
32 Citing the following -cases: "National L. Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 194
Ala. 658, 69 So. 823 (weekly payment) ; Magarahan v. Wright, 83 Ga. 773,
10 S. E. 584 (monthly payment); Odom v. Bush, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S. E.
1013 (monthly payment); Webb v. McCranie, 12 Ga. App. 269, 77 S. E.
175 (weekly payment); Nichols v. Coolahan, 10 Mete. 449 (monthly pay-
ment) ; (cf. Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1, 4, 85
N. E. 877); Chamberlain v. Detroit Stove Works, 103 Mich. 124, 61 N. W.
532 (annual salary); Horn v. Western Land Assoc., 22 Minn. 233 (annual
salary) ; Capron v. Strout, 11 Nev. 304 (price 'per day payable monthly'
held monthly hiring) ; Beach v. Mullin, 34 N. J. L. 343 (monthly payment) ;
Jones v. Manhattan Manure Co., 91 N. J. L. 406, 103 Atl. 984 (price 'per
year payable monthly', also providing for contingent payments at Christmas
and Easter. Held yearly hiring) ; Lyons v. Pease Piano Co., (N. J. L., 1019)
107 Atl. 66 (weekly salary, but also commission on annual sales. Held to
indicate yearly hiring); Gressing v. Musical Instrument Sales Co., 222 N.
Y. 215, 118 N. E. 627 (guaranteed income of a certain amount per annum) ;
Pinckney v. Talmage, 32 S. C. 364, 10 S. E. 1083 (wages payable monthly
'at the rate of $500 a year' held monthly hiring); Young v. Lewis, 0
Tex. 73 (monthly payment); San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sale (Tex. Civ.
App.), 31 S. W. 325 (monthly payment); Cronemillar v. Milling Co., 134
7
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It would seem, however, that the view adopted by Mr.
Williston should be modified as follows. Mr. Williston
says that "should the parties continue their relation after
the expiration of the first period, another contract by im-
plication of fact would arise for another similar period."
It would seem, however, that such "another contract by
implication of fact" would not necessarily arise, but only
that it should be (in the ordinary language of the courts)
"presumed", or more accurately 'that there should be a not-
necessarily-conclusive inference of fact,"3 that another con-
tract arises for another such period, because the same rea-
sons for such a "presumption", or rather inferetwe of fact,
would exist then as existed before.
3 4
Wis. 248, 114 N. W. 432 (monthly payment). So in California Civil Code,
See. 2010, it is provided that if payments are made at a fixed rate, a hiring
is intended for the same period in the absence of express agreement. 
And
in Sec. 2011 it is provided that in the absence of agreement, custom, 
or
fixed rate of hiring, a month's employment is presumed. This California
legislation has been copied in Mont. Rev. Codes (1907), Sees. 5280, 5281;
N. Dak. Rev. Codes (1905), Sees. 5572, 5573; Okla. Gen. St. (1908), 
See.
4044; S. Dak. Rev. Code (1903). Sees. 1477, 1478. The statutes of 
these
States also provide that on the termination of one period of service for a
term thus implied, if the service continues without new agreement, another
term of the same length is presumed. See also Emmens v. Elderton, 4 H.
L. C. 624; Buckingham v. Surrey & Hants Canal Co., 46 L. T. AN. -S.) 885;
Foxall v. International Land Credit Co., 16 L. T. (N. S.) 637; Smith v.
Theobald, 86 Ky. 141, 146, 5 S. W. 394; Great Northern Hotel Co. v.
Leopold, 72 Ill. App. 108. In considering the English decisions cited above,
it must be borne in mind that in England an indefinite hiring is pre-
sumptively for a year, and consequently a. yearly salary merely adds force
to the general presumption." Italics ours. See also Southwell v. Parker
Plow Co., 234 Mich. 292, 207 N. W. 872 (1926).
33 As to the distinction between a genuine presumption and the so-called
"presumption of fact", which is not a true presumption but a mere inference
of fact, see WiaMoaE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed. §§2487, 2491 (1923). That there
is a mere inference of fact (a so-called "presumption of fact") rather than
a true legal presumption where the parties continue their relation after the
expiration of the first period, see Williams v. John T. Hesser Coal Co., 207
Mo. App. 197, 231 S. W. 680 (1921) where the court said: "It being con-
ceded that at the end of the second year and also at the end of the third
year plaintiff continued in the defendant's service without a new agreement,
the presumption arose that the employment was to continue through an-
other year. Such a presumption is one of fact, and does not alter, but
continues, the terms of the original contract, and does not convert an ex-
press into an implied contract, but simply raises an inference of fact that
the parties agreed to extend the operation of the old contract for another
year." But see the language of Judge Henry Wade Rogers quoted in the
following footnote.
34 See McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 Atl. 176 (1887):
"The presumption is, when the service continues, it is under the same con-
tract * * *. Being only a presumption it is liable to rebuttal by evidence of
8
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Hence, the doctrine of the Alkire Case is preferable, but
even it is unsound in that the Alkire Case lays down the
doctrine as if it is an inflexible agency doctrine"0 rather
than a rebuttable inference of fact. The sound doctrine
must not be understood as meaning that all agreements of
agency which specify that the agent is to receive so much
for each day, month, or other fixed period and contain no
other stipulations as to duration, are necessarily terminable
at the end of such period.' Though some cases, including
the Alkire Case, seem to take this view, there is, or at least
should be, no such agency doctrine. There should be rather
a rebuttable inference of fact that such agreements are so
terminable and an objective interpretation with the aid of
such inference.
To sum up, it is submitted that the general problem is
simply a question of the construction of the so-called "con-
tract of agency", to be judged objecbively. Where there is
no stipulation as to duration, not even a provision that the
payment is to be so much per fixed period, it should be
(in the ordinary language of the courts) "presumed", or
more accurately there should be an inference of fact, that
the duration is at will. Where, however, there is no stipu-
lation as to duration except a provision that the payment is
a change of contract." See also Associated Newspapers v. Phillips, 294 Fed.
845, 849 (1923). Opinion by Judge Henry Wade Rogers, who says: "And
where one enters into another's service for a definite period, and continues in
the employment after the expiration of that period without any new agree-
ment, the legal presumption is that the employment is continued on the
terms of the original contract, unless facts are proven which are sufficient
to rebut that presumption."
35 See particularly point 1 of the syllabus which is by the court and reads
as follows: "1. MASTER AND SERVANT-Employment Contract-e-rmi.
nation.
A contract for work and labor which provides for a monthly salary to be
paid by one party to the other and does not specify any term of employ-
ment, may be terminated at the end of any month by either of the parties
thereto?'
3t This is aptly illustrated by the case of Pfiester v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 282 Ill. 69, 118 N. E. 407 (1918). See also Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg.
Co., 106 Mass. 56, 58-59 (1870) where, with reference to an employment
with quarterly payments, the court said: "There was no express stipulation,
either written or oral, which fixed the time for the continuance of the em-
ployment of the plaintiff by the defendant. That element of their contract
depended upon the understanding and intent of the parties; which could be
ascertained only by inference from their written and oral negotiations, the
usuages of the business, the situation of the parties, the nature of the em-
ployment, and all the circumstances of the case."
9
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to be so much per fixed period, 7 there should be an infer-
ence of fact that such an agreement is for at least one such
period. Where the parties continue their relation after the
expiration of the first period, there should be an inference
of fact that another contract arises for another such period.
But in all three cases the inferences should be rebuttable;
and competent evidence, such as general custom in the busi-
ness, may show that in a given case the agreement is termi-
nable otherwise than in accordance with such so-called
"presumptions"."8
37 A contract of agency containing such a provision is herein treated un-
der the title of this article for the reason that, though a provision of this
sort is in a sense a stipulation as to duration, many courts do not so treat
it. But where there is admittedly a stipulation as to duration, e. g., a pro-
vision that the employment shall be permanent, the question does not fall
within the scope of this comment. As to the validity and effect of such
stipulations, see, e. g., Rua v. Bowyer Smokeless Coal Co., 84 W. Va. 47, 56,-
99 S. E. 213 (1919), and 1 WILLSTON, op. Cit., supra, n. 1, §39.
38 See Pfiester v. Western Union Tel. Co., 282 Ill. 69, 75, 118 N. E. 407
(1918). With respect to an offer to pay a baseball player $300 per month
the court, per Mr. Justice Farmer, said: "Tie message of the Milwaukee
Club to plaintiff did not expressly say its offer was $300 per month for
the season, but both that club and the plaintiff knew the custom and prac-
tice of contracting for the playing season of some six months, and- it will
be implied, in the absence of an expressed contrary intention, that it con-
tracted with reference to such known custom and usage. * * * While a con-
tract providing for payment at or for stated intervals may create a pre-
sumption that the hiring was for corresponding intervals, the circumstances
attending the hiring, including the nature of the services and the customs
and usages attending the particular employment, should be looked to in de-
termining the length of the employment. (Smith v. Theobold, 86 Ky. 141.)
Applying this rule to the facts in this case, we think the contract, if en-
tered into had the telegram been received and its terms accepted, would
have been for the base ball season."
10
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